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The Ethical Implications
of the Limited Liability Status
in the Practice of Law
BY ELIZABETH C. WOODFORD*
INTRODUCTION
he Kentucky Limited Liability Company Act,' like similar laws
passed m numerous states, was intended to extend the
advantages of the limited liability corporation ("LLC") or
partnership ("LLP") to professionals. Anxious to enjoythis new status, 748
Kentucky businesses organized themselves as LLCs or LLPs within a year
of the Act's passage.2 The Kentucky Supreme Court responded, however,
by rejecting a proposed rule which would have expressly allowed the
practice of law in these limited liability forms.3 The refusal was grounded
in the court's assertion that lawyers may not "'so limit their liability'4
Tins appeared to affirm Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h):
A lawyer shall notmake an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's
liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client
is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim
for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without
first advising that person m writing that independent representation is
appropriate in connection therewith.5
J.D. expected 1999, University of Kentucky.
tKY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 275 (Michle Supp. 1996).
2 See John T. Ballantine & Thomas E. Rutledge, Kentucky Supreme Court
Rejects Use of LLCs, LLPs and PSCs by Attorneys, KY. BENCH & BAR, Winter
1996, at21, 21.
3 See d. at 29.
4 Id. (quoting In re Order Amending Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) Rules of Supreme Court 95-1 (Sept. 22, 1995)).
5 KY. Sup. CT.R. 3.130; MODELRULEs OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h)
(1998).
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The court acted to prevent the indirect accomplishment of a goal long
prohibited by attorneys' ethical guidelines. Courts in other states
considering the interplay between similar LLC statutes and the same or
similar Model Rule have reached inconsistent conclusions. Indeed, as
discussed below, several states expressly authorize the practice of law by
LLCs and LLPs, often creating additional rules m an attempt to protect the
spirit of Model Rule 1.8(h).6 While the Kentucky Supreme Court's
resolution of the issue may not be popular among law firms, 7 it preserves
an inportant and essential tradition of the legal profession-the tradition of
protecting clients' interests even at the risk of exposure to malpractice
liability
The form in which attorneys are permitted to practice law is
intertwined with the profession's evolving ideas about attorneys'
accountability and liability, both individually and vicariously This Note
does not attempt an rn-depth evaluation of the ramifications of practicing
law as an LLC or LLP aside from the ethical considerations presented by
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.8 Instead, this Note explores the
effect the Model Rules and other ideas about professional responsibility
have on the entities available to law firms.
Parts I and II of this Note explore the development of these closely
related issues. While the Kentucky Supreme Court's refusal to allow law
firms to become LLPs or LLCs may appear restrictive, the early attitude
6 See Infra Part mJI.
7 The Kentucky Supreme Court's prohibition of the practice of law by LLPs or
LLCs was especially unwelcome to the Kentucky law firms wlnch had adopted
such a form before receiving permission from the court. The options available to
such firms are discussed m Ballantine & Rutledge, supra note 2, at 30. For
example, these firms may choose to reconvert from LLC or LLP form to a general
partnership, to keep the LLC or LLP entity but practice without the limited liability
status conferred by the Kentucky LLC statute, or to ignore the Kentucky Supreme
Court's decision. See id.
' For a thorough analysis of other aspects of the LLC/LLP form, such as federal
income taxation, continuity of life, transferability of interests, and centralized
management, as well as a comparison of LLCs and LLPs with general partnerships,
limited partnerships, and close corporations, see generally Robert R. Keatinge et
al., The LimitedLiability Company: A Study ofthe EmergingEntity, 47 BUS. LAW.
378 (1992) [hereinafterKeatinge et al., TheLimitedLiability Company]; RobertR.
Keatinge & George W Coleman, Practice ofLawbyLzmitedLzabilityPartnershps
andLimitedLiability Companies, PROF. LAW. (ABA Ctr. for Prof'I Responsibility,
Chicago, Ill.), 1995 Symposium, at 5 [hereinafter Keatinge & Coleman, Practice
ofLaw].
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that law firms could'not incorporate at all must be remembered. As the
availability of options to law firms increased, ideas about vicarious liability
and the policies behind Model Rule 1.8(h) evolved rather than eroded.9
Part III analyzes the reception given to LLC and LLP statutes by other
states' supreme courts, demonstrating the wide variety of approaches to the
problem ofwhether a firm practicing as a limited liability organization may
still conform to the ethical and legal expectations of the profession. Some
states have attempted a compromise, allowing law firms to practice as
LLCs or LLPs, but subjecting them to additional rules and restrictions
imposed by bar authorities.10 Finally, Part IV evaluates Kentucky's
resolution of the issue.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FORMS IN WHICH TO PRACTICE LAW
A. The Regulatory Power of State Supreme Courts
In choosing an organizational form mwhichto practice, law firms have
not been permitted to select from the wide variety of entities available to
nonprofessionals. The matter has long been governed by state supreme
courts, which typically have the authority to regulate the legal profession."
Regardless of how they resolve the issue, state supreme courts have
emphasized and reaffirmed their power to refuse or grant permission to law
firms to practice as some type of limited liability entity 12 Some state
LLC/LLP statutes implicitlyinclude attorneys inthe group ofprofessionals
who may use this type of organization, 13 but neither express nor inplied
legislative authority is enough to allow law firms to convert to a limited
liability form. The regulators of the legal profession must approve the use
ofthis entity by lawyers before the statutes will have any practical effect. 4
Courts have made clear that notwithstanding legislative action, only the
9 See infra Part II.
See infra Part I.
uSee infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1961); In re New
Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 266 A.2d 853, 854 (N.H. 1970); In re Rhode Island Bar
Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692, 694 (R.I. 1970).
11 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7603 (1995) (authorizing an LLC to "conduct or
promote any lawful business which a partnership or individual may conduct or
promote").
14 See Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company, supra note 8, at 458.
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judicial branch vestedwith regulation ofthe bar may approve the LLC/LLP
form for attorneys:
[T]he power of the court to regulate and control the practice of law
remained where it had always been, notwithstanding the exercise by the
General Assembly of its undoubted power to declare acts of unauthorized
practice illegal in aid of the authority of this court m the regulation
and control of the practice of the law, and not subversive to it.15
Similarly, aNew Hampshire court remarked, "The power and authority
of the Supreme Court to supervise and regulate the practice of law has been
recognized and acknowledged from an early date by custom, practice,
judicial decision, and statute."'16
The "veto power" given to state supreme courts concerning the
organizational forms available to firms is justified in two ways. First, the
courts exercise this power because, as a matter of public policy, judges and
not legislators are best suited to regulate the practice of law 17 Second,
because the application of LLC and LLP statutes to the practice of law is
so closely intertwined with the judicial branch, a separation of powers
doctrine dictates that state supreme courts have the ability to override the
legislature in this matter. 8 Therefore, state courts which have either
granted or denied law firms the right to organize themselves as limited
liability entities have not been constrained by statutory language. Because
only thejudicial branch may regulate the practice of law, the legislature has
no power to make final determinations regarding the limitation of liability
of shareholders and members of law firms. 19
Likewise, the Kentucky Supreme Court examined the LLC/LLP issue
pursuant to its long-standing authority to regulate the practice of law 20
Although Kentucky's LLC statute contemplates the use of the limited
15In re Rhode Island BarAss'n, 263 A.2d at 694.
16 In re New Hampshire Bar Ass', 266 A.2d at 854.
" See Keatinge & Coleman, Practice ofLaw, supra note 8, at 35.
'8 See id. at 35-36 (citing David Paas, Professional Corporations and Attorney-
Shareholders: The Decline ofLimited Liability, 11 J. CORP. L. 371 (1986)).
i9 See Paas, supra note 18, at 383.
20Section 116 ofthe Kentucky Constitution grants the Kentucky Supreme Court
power to govern "admission to the bar and the discipline of members of the bar."
KY. CONST. § 116. Section 116 was interpreted in Ex Parte Auditor of Public
Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980), as completely removing regulation of the
bar "from any legislative authority and render[ing] obsolete and ineffective the
statutes pertaining to it." Id. at 684.
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liability form by professionals, subject to certain exceptions not imposed
onnonprofessional groups,2' the court actedwellwithm its exclusive power
to approve or disapprove of legislative acts so closely affecting the practice
of law in the state.' Unless the court overturns its decision disallowing this
form for the practice of law, firms must adhere to the ruling or risk
professional discipline.
B. Early Attitudes Toward the Practice ofLaw in Corporate Form
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court's disapproval ofthe practice of
law in the LLC/LLP form may have been "surprising as well as
disconcerting" to some firms,13 the ability to practice in any organizational
form has not always been assumed. In the early part of the century, state
bar authorities typically asserted the general rule that the "learned
professions" could not incorporate themselves.24 Courts which refused to
allow the practice of law in corporate form grounded their decisions on the
unique relationship between attorneys and clients.'
Two early cases demonstrate the policies and concerns behind this
general prohibition of the incorporation of law firms. In In re Co-operative
Law Co.,26 the Court ofApp eals of New York held that a group of attorneys
could not lawfully organize under the state's business corporations law 27
Although the court acknowledged the legislature's power to authorize the
formation of corporations to carry on "any lawful business," it interpreted
the statute to exclude the "learned professions."28 The court was primarily
concernedthat an attorney's loyalty would belong to the corporation, rather
than to his or her client:
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a
limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and
21 See K.R.S. § 275.380 (Michie Supp. 1996).
2 See Paas, supra note 18, at 383.
2 Ballantine & Rutledge, supra note 2, at 21.
24 See J.F Rydstrom, Annotation, Practice by Attorneys and Physicians as
Corporate Entities or Associations Under Professional Service Corporation
Statutes, 4 A.L.R.3d 383, 385 (1965).
' See id. (stating that the "noncorporate status of the lawyer or physician was
deemed necessary to preserve to the client or patient the benefits of a highly
confidential relationship, based on personal confidence, ability, and integrity").261 In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910).
2 See id. at 17
28Id. at 16-17
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confidence. [I]t cannot exist between an attorney employed by a
corporation to practice law for it, and a client of the corporation, for he
would be subject to the directions of the corporation, and not to the
directions of the client. The corporation would control the litigation,
the money earned would belong to the corporation, and the attorney
would be responsible to the corporation only. His master would not be the
client but the corporation 29
In holding that the statute authorizing business corporations did not
extend to attorneys, the court commented that physicians were also
excluded. Just as a lawyer owes Is or her fidelity to clients and not to the
corporation, a physician should place his or her loyalty only with patients.30
These, according to the court, were the "great professions, which for time
out of mind have been given exclusive rights and subjected to peculiar
responsibilities." '31
In re Opinion of the Justices32 was a response by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts to the state legislature's question: could the
legislature act either to forbid or permit the practice of law by corporations
or associations?33 The court responded that the legislature could only
prohibit and never authorize such a practice. 4 Like the New York Court of
Appeals in In re Co-operative Law Co., the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court based its holding partly on the nature of the attorney-client
relationship, stating that a corporation could never perform such a human
function:
A dual trust is imposed on attorneys at law: they must act with all good
fidelity both to the courts and to their clients. The relation of an
attorney to his client is pre-emmently confidential. In addition to adequate
learning, it demands on the part of the attorney undivided allegiance, a
conspicuous degree of faithfulness and disinterestedness, absolute
integrity, and utter renunciation of every personal advantage conflicting
in any way directly or indirectly with the interests of his client Only a
human being can conform to these exacting requirements. Artificial
creations such as corporations or associations cannot meet these
prerequisites. 35
29Id. at 16.
30 See id.
31 Id. at 17
321In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313 (Mass. 1935).33 See zd. at 316.
34 See id.
31 Id. at317
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did hold that the state
legislature would be acting within its scope of authority bypassing a statute
forbidding the practice of law by corporations. Indeed, the court seemed to
encourage such a law, stating that it would "enhance" the judicial branch. 6
The court even suggested that "[c]nimes nght be established for the
infraction of prohibitions of such practice of the law "37
In considering the ethical implications ofpermittingthe practice of law
by an LLC or LLP, it is useful to note these traditional views toward
corporate practice. In re Co-operative Law Co. and In re Opinion of the
Justices condemned the practice of law in any corporate form. Although
few states adhere to such a strict rule today, the underpinnings of the above
cases-the unique sort of loyalty and responsibility an attorney owes a
client-are still rooted in case law as well as in the Model Rules. 8
Those who supported the practice of law as professional corporations
may have sought only a business form which would be taxed as a
corporation, with muted interest in acquiring limited liability 39 In United
States v. Kintner,4° one of the earliest acknowledgments of a professional
corporation, the court held that a group of doctors working together in a
clinic under articles of association could be treated as a corporation rather
than a partnership for tax purposes. 41
Attorneys followed the physicians' example. By the 1960s, corporate
forms of law practice increased and diversified. As the Internal Revenue
Code changed, attorneys began soliciting legislatures, bar associations, and
state supreme courts for permission to adopt corporate forms of practice.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") announced its support of federal
legislation which would extend to self-employed attorneys the same tax
privileges which had been long enjoyed by employees of nonprofessional
corporations.42 The ABA gave its qualified blessing to law firms practicing
36 Seeid. at 316.
37 Id.
3 See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225,232-
33 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a client has an "absolute right to the firm's
undivided loyalty"); Alexanderv. Russo, 571 P.2d 350,357 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977)
(describing the relationship between a lawyer and client as one of utmost trust and
confidence); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 (1998)
(stating that "[1loyalty is an essential element m the lawyer's relationship to a
client").
31 See Keatinge & Coleman, Practice ofLaw, supra note 8, at 33.40 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
41 See id. at 428.
42 See Eugene J. Koegh,Tax Equity for the Self-Employed, 47 A.B.A. J. 665,
665 (1961).
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as professional associations or corporations, even if they possessed
characteristics of limited liability.43 Issued m 1961, ABA Formal Opinion
303 stated that while the Committee on Professional Ethics did not intend
to remark on the wisdom of the practice of law as aprofessional association
or corporation, it was a subject on which "the members of the Committee
have grave doubts." Stressing an asserted distinction between
"professional liability" and "legal liability," the Committee stated that law
firms could utilize a form of organization involving limited liability only
if certain requirements were met:
• The attorney rendering the service remains personally responsible.
* The fact of limited liability is made clear to the client.
" Firm ownership is limited to attorneys.
* No fees are shared with non-attorneys.
" Management of the firm is exclusively by attorneys.45
Although ABA Formal Opinion 303 set forth important safeguards
adopted by state supreme courts that later ruled that attorneys could
practice in the LLC/LLP form, it should not be read as an approval of the
practice of law m LLC or LLP forms today for several reasons. First, ethics
opinions issued by the ABA (as well as the Model Rules and Model Code)
are not binding on state supreme courts or state bar associations. The
opinions and rules promulgated by the ABA are intended as advisories or
models and are meaningless unless adopted by a state supreme court.'
Second, ABA Formal Opinion 303 was issued long before the approval of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In 1961, most state bar members
were governed by the Canons of Professional Ethics, drafted in 1908. The
Canons had no rule similar to Model Rule 1.8(h) and contemplated the
practice of law only m a general partnership form.47 Although the successor
to the Canons, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, had a
43 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961).
4Id.
" Joseph P McMomgle et al., NavigatingPartnership Perils, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1996, at 84, 84.
46 See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RES-
PONSIBILITY 13 (6th ed. 1995). "Courts often cite such opinions as evidence of the
law, but they are not formally binding on any lawyer." Id.
47 See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 33 (1908), reprinted in
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1998 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 616 (1998).
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counterpart to the later Rule 1.8(h) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the Model Code was not adopted by the ABA until 1969 4
Therefore, in interpreting Formal Opimon 303 on the practice of law by
corporations, it is unportant to note that at that date there was not yet a rule
prohibiting an attorney from prospectively limiting ins or her potential
malpractice liability
C. The Rise ofLimited Liability Companies and Partnerships
The influx of LLCILLP statutes throughout the nation has been
attributed to a desire to "craft the perfect business entity, one that limits the
liability of its owners to their investment while avoiding the taxation of
business income at the entity level."49 There appear to be as many
approaches to the meaning of "limited liability" m the professional context
as there are state LLC/LLP statutes. Most statutes allow the removal ofthe
liability of a member or manager for the liabilities incurred by the LLC or
its members."0 Some statutes remove an attorney's malpractice liability for
the tort of another member of the firm, provided that the attorney did not
participate m or supervise the misconduct. These statutes may state that the
LLC or LLP status will only protect attorneys from vicarious liability
arising from tort claims involving the law firm's business dealings, leaving
breach of contract claims uncovered.51 Other statutes go further and limit
the liability of the attorney for contractual liability, provided that the
attorney did not expressly assume or give assurance for the contractual
obligation.52 Finally, some statutes allow the limitation ofvicanous liability
only for misconduct arsing from "the provision of professional services,"
so that attorneys are still individually liable for the company's contractual
obligations and for the tortious acts of other members. 3 This limited
4s See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 12.
49 James C. Seiffert & Alan K. MacDonald, The Kentucky Limited Liability
Company Act: An Analysis of Applications in Its Second Year, KY. BENCH & BAR,
Winter 1996, at 20, 20.
11 See Anthony E. Davis, LimitedLiabilityforLawyers, PROF. LAW. (ABA Ctr.
forProf'l Responsibility, Chicago, Ill.), Aug. 1995, at 1, 4. "While the statutes vary
as to the scope of protections apparently promised by the new business structures,
the proponents of these laws certainly intend that they work to limit the liabilities
of lawyers who seek the shelter which they are supposed to offer." Id.
s' See MeMonigle et al., supra note 45, at 84.
S2 ee Davis, supra note 50, at 4.
53See McMomgle et al., supra note 45, at 84. If attorneys remain vicanously
liable for other associates' tortious acts, this "may include claims ranging from
1998-99]
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liability is, however, subject to an important exception. No LLC/LLP
statute will abrogate an attorney's personal liability for his or her own act,
omission, or other malpractice, and several statutes expressly state that a
professional remains liable for the misconduct of those under his or her
supervision.54 Further, several state courts allowing a firm to incorporate
itself as an LLC or LLP have expressly noted that this new status "will not
be permitted to protect the unfaithful or the unethical '5 5 and will not allow
attorneys to "be cloaked with an immunity inimical to legal order and
public mterest. '56
Kentucky's LLC statute is sinilar to its counterparts m other states. It
generally provides that a member or manager of a Kentucky LLC shall not
be liable for torts, breaches of contracts, or acts and omissions of those
associated with the LLC5 Exceptions to this limited liability include the
provisions that a member or manager must still be personally responsible
for the liabilities created by his or her own conduct and that a member or
manager must remain liable to the LLC or its members for wanton or
reckless misconduct.58 Essentially, however, an attorney practicing within
a Kentucky LLC would be free from vicarious liability for malpractice
claims brought against other attorneys in the corporation.5 9
Because attorneys practicing in LLCs and LLPs remain personally
liable for their own acts and omissions, Model Rule 1.8(h) is at least
partially met. Attorneys cannot make agreements prospectively releasing
themselves from personal liability incurred because of their own
professional acts. However, the practice of law in partnerships or groups
has a long tradition of vicarious liability Rule 1.8(h) is not expressly
limited to "personal" liability Assuming Rule 1.8(h) inpliedly prohibits
the prospective limitation of vicarious as well as personal liability (or, if it
does not, assuming case law imposing vicarious liability has not been
overruled by Model Rule 1.8(h)), LLCs and LLPs may still violate the
ethical guidelines adopted by state supreme courts.
breach of fiduciary duty to sexual harassment." Id.
' See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-1306(1) (1997). A member or an em-
ployee of a professional LLC will be liable for the misconduct of other employees
if that employee is at fault m supervising them. See id.
55 In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961).
56 Street v Sugerman, 202 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967).
See K.R.S. § 275.150 (Michie Supp. 1996).
58See Seiffert & MacDonald, supra note 49, at 24. Some statutes expressly state
thatprofessionals in an LLC will remain personally liable for their own negligence.
See Davis, supra note 50, at 4.
59See Ballantine & Rutledge, supra note 2, at 21.
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II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
The interest of law firms in finding new ways to organize themselves
is driven largely by attorneys' desire to reduce their vicarious liability 60
Even if state LLC/LLP statutes expressly permit the limitation of personal
malpractice liability, the Model Rules, where adopted, expressly prohibit
this.61
The desire to reduce the costs of vicarious liability is understandable,
if not permissible. From 1982 to 1992, claims against members of
Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society grew from 3.8 per 1000 attorneys
eachyearto 11.3 per 1000 attorneys each year.62 A 1992 surveyreveals that
during a two-year period, forty percent of studied firms were defending a
malpractice clam. 63 Additionally, from 1982 to 1989, the average loss
grew from $1.3 million to $7.9 million, indicating that "[t]he severity of the
claims has risen dramatically " The legal profession's fear of
vicarious malpractice liability is well-founded, which explains the search
for business entities capable of reducing these high costs.
A. The Tradition of Vicarious Liability
As a general rule, partners in a law firm are vicariously liable for the
malpractice of any one partner.65 Unlike individual and supervisory
liability, vicarious liability is not mcurred by an attorney because of his or
her personal acts or omissions, either in the practice of law or the
supervision of another. The vicarious liability of an attorney-shareholder
in a firm may result from the tortious conduct and breaches of contractual
or fiduciary duties of another attorney within a firm.66
Malpractice itself may be defined simply as an attorney's failure to
meet his or her duty to a client by exercising "the knowledge, skill, and
ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal
profession similarly situated."67 Typically, vicarious liability can be
60 See Keatinge & Coleman, Practice ofLaw, supra note 8, at 32.
61 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1998).
62See Keatinge & Coleman, Practice ofLaw, supra note 8, at 6.
63 See id.
4Rita Henley Jensen, Malpractice Insurers 'Bad Patch, NAT'L L.J., Nov 9,
1992, at 3, 33 (basing statistics on a survey of 50 law firms between these dates).
65 See Keatinge & Coleman, Practice ofLaw, supra note 8, at 19.
6See id. at 17-19.
67 J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Vicarious Liability ofAttorneyfor Tort ofPartner
in Law Firm, 70 A.L.R.3d 1298, 1300 (1976).
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imposed on all members of a firm if one member's malpractice occurred
as part of the firm's ordinary course ofbusmess or with another attorney's
authority, even if other members had no actual knowledge of or
participation m the misconduct giving rise to the malpractice claim. 8
Despite the expense of vicarious liability, as demonstrated by the
abovementioned statistics, sound policies support it.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers imposes vicarious
liability on law firms and their members "for injury legally caused to a
person by any wrongful act or omission of any principal or employee of the
firm who was acting m the ordinary course of the firm's business or with
actual authority"69 The comment to this rule explains that vicarious
liability "helps to maintain the quality of legal services, by requiring not
only a firm but also its principals to stand behind the performance of other
firm personnel."' This approach follows a long tradition of vicarious
liability within the legal profession.71
Kentucky courts have long held partners of law firms liable for each
other's malpractice. In Whitaker v. Kesler,2 a semor partner left the state
without returning received money to a client. The court held that another
member of the firm was liable to the client for the lost sum, even in the
absence of evidence suggesting the other member had any knowledge of or
participation inthe semorpartner's misconduct.' In Kentucky, the concept
of "malpractice liability" embraces and includes vicarious liability for
malpractice committed by members of a law firm.
6 See generally Blackmon v. Hale, 463 P.2d 418 (Cal. 1970); Model Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Reeves, 186 N.Y.S. 759 (Sup. Ct. 1921), rev'd on other grounds,
194 N.Y.S. 383 (App. Div. 1922), rev'd, 140 N.E. 715 (N.Y. 1923).
6 9 REsTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 (Tentative Draft No.
8, 1997).7 1 Id. § 79 cmt. b.
71 But see Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Derivative Liability ofPartner
for Punitive Damages for Wrongful Act of Copartner, 14 A.L.R.4th 1335 (1982).
Every member of a partnership is liable for a tort committed by one of the
members acting in the scope of the firm business, even if the other partners
did not participate m, ratify, or have knowledge of the tort But the rule with
respect to punitive damages is different. Generally, the courts have held that
a partner who did not authorize, participate in, or ratify the wrongful act of
Is copartner is not liable for punitive damages awarded in connection with
the partner's wrongful act, although there is authority to the contrary,
particularly in cases involving fraud.
Id. at 1336 (footnotes omitted).
2 Whitaker v. Kesler, 3 Ky. Op. 236 (1869).
713See zd. at 237
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The Model Rules do not take a position on the vicarious liability of law
firm partners. Rule 5.1 states that a lawyer is responsible for another
lawyer's violation of the rules if:
1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or
2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in wich the other lawyer
practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and
knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
74
Rule 5.1 appears to impose vicarious liability on one member of a firm
for another member's misconduct only if that member has supervisory
authority over the member who is charged with misconduct or if he or she
has actual knowledge ofthat misconduct. Comment 4 to the Rule states that
"[p]artners ofa private firm have at least indirect responsibility for all work
being done by the firm."75 Comment 6 further notes that apart from this
Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer is generally not subject to discipline for the
misconduct of another member or associate of his or her firm. The
comment does, however, distinguish between liability for disciplinary
purposes (with which the Rules are concerned) and civil or crinmal
liability for a colleague's misconduct, the latter being "beyond the scope
of these Rules. 76 Although the Model Rules may excuse vicarious
discipline for another attorney's violation of the Rules, they do not purport
to excuse vicarious liability for civil malpractice claims, which is a matter
left to state law As discussed above, the vicarious liability of a firm
member for a malpractice claim brought against another member is deeply
rooted in Kentucky 77
B. Model Rule 1.8(h): A Prohibition of the Prospective Lzmitation
of Lability
Vicarious malpractice liability, a creature of the common law imposed
by individual state supreme courts in their regulation of the legal
profession, is not expressly outlined in the Model Rules. By contrast, the
Model Rules are quite clear on whether malpractice liability may be limited
74 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(c)(1)-(2) (1998).
751 Id. Rule 5.1 cmt. 4.76 Id. Rule 5.1 cint. 6.
77 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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by an attorney before representation begms. Model Rule 1.8(h) states: "A
lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's
liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client
is independently represented m makmng the agreement 2"78
The Rule has its origins m the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 6-102 forbade any attorney from
attempting "to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for
his personal malpractice. ' 79 The Code reinforced this disciplinary rule with
Ethical Consideration ("EC") 6-6. Though not binding, that provision
cautioned attorneys that "[a] lawyer who handles the affairs of his client
properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional
activities and one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly
should not be permitted to do so."80
Concededly, the Model Code considered ABA Formal Opinion 3031
and, as an ethical consideration, noted that an attorney practicing m a
professional legal corporation may limit his or her own liability for other
members' malpractice, "but only to the extent permittedby law "2 Because
almost all state supreme courts, and not state legislatures, are vested with
the authority to regulate the practice of law, EC 6-6 permitted the limitation
of vicarious malpractice liability of attorneys practicing in professional
corporations only to the extent those courts chose to allow the limitation.83
More importantly, the more recent and widely accepted Model Rules of
Professional Conduct include no such caveat. Rule 1.8(h) disallows the
78 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1998). See also
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-400(A) (West 1996)
(stating that a member shall not "[c]ontract with a client prospectively limiting the
member's liability to the client for the member's professional malpractice");
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (Michie
1998) (adopting language similar to that of Model Rule 1.8(h)); N.Y. JUD. LAW §
1200.31 [DR 6-102] (McKinney Supp. 1998).
79 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102(A) (1980).
80 Id. EC 6-6.
81 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
82 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 6-6 (1980) (footnote
omitted).
13 Remer v. Kelley, 457 N.E.2d 946, 950-51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (imposing
vicarious liability on members of a firm whose partner had violated EC 6-6, where
a state statute and the state supreme court required that an attorney who is a
stockholder malegal professional association guarantee financial responsibility for
the association's breach of any duty, including the duty of the association to pay
its debts).
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prospective limitation of malpractice liability-except where permitted by
law and when the client is independently represented in making such an
agreement-without express or implied regard to whether an attorney
practices in corporate or noncorporate form.8"
EC 6-6 of the Model Code does, however, provide an mtriguing
parallel with the traditional prejudice against the practice of law in
corporate form. As discussed above,85 early decisions forbade, or at least
discouraged, the incorporation of law firms due to concerns regarding the
attorney-client relationship. These courts stated that an attorney owes a
special duty of loyalty to a client and shares with the client a unique
relationship of trust. By choosing a corporate form, the courts feared an
attorney's loyalty and primary relationship would belong to a faceless
corporation rather than to the client. Likewise, EC 6-6 arose out of concern
for the attorney-client relationship, taking the approach that a limitation of
malpractice liability is necessary only when an attorney does not intend
or is mcapable of providing loyal and competent representation to a
client.8
6
Model Rule 1.8(h) has been applied by the supreme courts of several
states in disciplinary proceedings, resulting in consequences ranging
from public reprimands to six-month suspensions. 7 Its predecessor, DR 6-
102, was utilized fairly recently in Kentucky 18 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
84 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1998). Model
Rule 1.8(h) also prohibits an attorney from obtaining a release from malpractice
liability after the malpractice has been committed unless the attorney advises the
client in writing that independent representation is appropriate. Releases from
malpractice liability are distinguished from prospective releases which are
prohibited unless the client does m fact have independent counsel. The ability for
an attorney to obtain this retrospective release may, however, be limited by the
courts. See, e.g., Marshall v. Higginson, 813 P.2d 1275 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that although the attorney fulfilled the obligations imposed by the Model
Rules in advising a client to obtain independent counsel in signing a release for
malpractice liability, the agreement violated public policy and was unenforceable
because the attorney insinuated that she would not provide testimony the client
needed unless the release was signed).85 See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text
86 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-6 (1980).
17 See generally In re Blackwelder, 615 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. 1993); In re Cissna,
444 N.E.2d 851 (Ind. 1983); Committee on Legal Ethics of the W Va. State Bar
v. Cometti, 430 S.E.2d 320 (W Va. 1993).
" Model Rule 1.8(h) was later adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See
KY. SuP CT.R. 3.130(1.8).
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Vincent 9 involved the disbarment of an attorney for, among other
violations, an attempt to limit his malpractice liability 90 Just as the implied
limitation on malpractice liability present in the LLC/LLP form may
violate Model Rule 1.8(h), other actions by attorneys may also be impliedly
prohibited by the rle.91
As one commentator has noted, both DR 6-101 of the Model Code and
Rule 1.8(h) of the Model Rules are important in the consideration of
whether a firm may adopt a limited liability status because these rules "to
a greater or lesser degree expressly preclude limitation of liability by
lawyers from malpractice claims. The question, therefore, is whether this
preclusion extends to the vicarious liability for the acts of others from
which the new statutes are intended to protect lawyers-among other
professionals." 92
Im. THE RESOLUTION OF THE LLC/LLP ISSUE IN OTHER STATES
Although some state statutes expressly prohibit the use of an LLC or
LLP for the practice of law while other statutes expressly allow it,93 the
statutory language is meaningless without the approval of the state's
supreme court. Among those state supreme courts which have addressed
the issue, a substantial number appear to have approved the practice of law
m some limited liability form.94 However, these courts leave unanswered
a variety of Model Rule 1.8(h) concerns arising from the use of such an
entity by a law firm. Also, many of the decisions add important
19 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v Vincent 819 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1991) (sanctioning
attorney for attempting to limit his liability to a client for malpractice as well as
attempting to obtain a client's promise not to file a complaint with the Kentucky
Bar Association).
90 See id. at 314.
91 See Joanne Pitulla, Please Release Me: There is No Easy Way Around Mal-
practice Liability, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 92, 92 (commenting that Model Rule
1.8(h) has been used to prevent coercive behavior by attorneys, such as "refusing
to forward clients' files until a release of all malpractice claims has been signed");
Joanne Pitulla, Taking Note: Securing Fees by Confessions ofJudgment, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1993, at 117, 117 (commenting that Model Rule 1.8(h) may prevent
attorneys from seeking confessions of judgment from clients to secure fees before
representation begins).
92 Davis, supra note 50, at 4.
93 See Keatinge & Coleman, Practice ofLaw, supra note 8, at 39.
94 See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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requirements to the statutory authorization for a firm to be permitted to
make the conversion.
One early approval by a state supreme court of the practice of law m
a form permitting limited liability was offered by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court m In re Rhode IslandBarAss 'n. 5 The manner m which the
issue arose was to be repeated m other states: the state bar association filed
a petition with the state supreme court, asking for express, affirmative
approval of the practice of law in a corporate form as allowed under the
state's professional service corporation law 96 While the petitioners freely
admitted that a driving force behind the request was the prospect of
limiting an attorney's liability for torts committed by associates of his or
her firm, they also cited the need for other benefits conferred by the state's
professional service corporation law 97 These benefits included "tax-
qualified pension and profit-sharing plans, tax-free death benefits for
employees' beneficiaries and tax-free group life insurance[,] continuity
of life of the corporate entity, and the ease of transferring ownership
interests."98 The court briefly acknowledged the traditional argument
against the limited liability forms, that the attorney-client relationship
would be compromised, 99 and reaffirmed its own authority to either grant
or deny approval."° The court granted the petitioners' request, insisting
there would be no detrimental effect on the attorney-client relationship and
suggesting that the conversion from vicarious to personal liability of
attorneys was not terribly significant.'0' In fact, the court stated that
[t]he only substantial change made by the act from practice of law in
partnership form is that there will be limited liability in that the lawyer-
shareholders who do not participate m the rendering of the services out of
which an actionable wrong arises will be free from personal liability and
will not be responsible for the debts of the corporation.10
2
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly stated that its decision did not
sanction the limitation of an attorney's individual liability 03 Additionally,
95 In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1970).96 See id. at 693.
97 See id. at 695.98 Id. (footnote omitted).
99 See zd. at 696.
"0 See id. at 694.
'0' See id. at 696-97
102 Id.
103 See id. at 697
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it asserted that the state's professional service corporation law contained
safeguards to protect, if not preserve, clients' rights to vicarious liability 104
The act required mandatory liability insurance and the court insisted tins
would ensure that "the clients served by the corporation and the members
of the public who otherwise deal with the corporation will not suffer by
reason of such limited liability "s Thus, while a client would no longer be
able to bring a malpractice claim against the associate of an attorney who
behaved improperly m representation, the offending attorney's insurance
coveragewouldbe capable of fully satisfying any judgment obtamedbythe
client. The court found another safeguard in the fact that the corporate firm
itself would remain liable for malpractice claims against its members "to
the extent of the corporate assets."'06
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's resolution of the limited liability
problem left at least two concerns unaddressed. First, neither the promise
of sufficient insurance coverage nor the liability of the entity itself furthers
the purpose and policy of professional vicarious liability As discussed in
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, vicarious liability of firm
associates serves to ensure that clients receive the best possible legal
services. °7 Presumably, the fear of being sued for the misprisions of one's
associates prompts attorneys to expect and encourage colleagues to avoid
acts which may give rise to legal malpractice. A sort of firm-wide "honor
code," involving preventive measures rather than whistle-blowing, is
effectuated. An attorney who knows that the firm's insurance will protect
him or her from vicarious liability may be far less likely to follow this
honor code.
Second, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's assurance that the
corporation itself will be liable for any member's malpractice to the extent
of its corporate assets offers little solace to the client who is harmed to a
degree surpassing those assets. If the corporate law firm is able to liquidate
its assets before a claim for serious malpractice is brought, a client will
receive no protection from this so-called safeguard.
Similar criticisms may be made against the treatment of this issue by
other state supreme courts. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, the District
of Columbia, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, NewYork, Texas, andVirgnia
currently allow the practice of law m the limited liability formY' 8 As one
04 See id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
'07 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 cmt b (Tentative
DraftNo. 8, 1997).
"' See Robert R. Keatinge & George W Coleman, Professional Practices, in
PLANNING AND USING LIMITED LIABILITY VEHICLES: LIMITED LIABILITY PART-
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attorneyhas noted, however, in states mwhich supreme courts have spoken
affirmatively on the issue, "none of these opinions addresses the language
of Model Rule 1.8(h) requiring that, in addition to being permissible by
law, a client's consent to prior limitation of liability requires that the client
be independently represented." "' °
Initially, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the use ofthe limited
liability form by attorneys is impermissible."10 The issue was first
considered by the Court of Appeals of Georgia. In Zagona v. DuBose
Enterprises, Inc.,"' the Georgia Court of Appeals considered the vicarious
liability of an attorney/shareholder of a professional legal corporation for
another attorney/shareholder's malpractice." 2 Attorneys Zagona and Stoner
were shareholders of a professional corporation." 3 Georgia's Professional
CorporationAct, byreferenceto theBusmess Corporation Code, statedthat
shareholders are not personally liable for the debts of the corporation."4 In
connection with a real estate closing, Zagona issued checks to a client
which were dishonored due to insufficient funds in the corporate account.
Stoner had no involvement in these acts."5 The Court of Appeals of
Georgia held that vicarious liability would not be imposed,116 but the
Supreme Court of Georgia overturned the decision."1
7
NERsHrps, LIMrrED LiAmLITY COMPANIES, LImITED PARTNERsHIps, AND LIMITED
LABILITY LIMrrED PARTNERSHIPS 203,233 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Comm. on Continuing
Prof I Educ. Q243, 1996); see also Keatinge & Coleman, Practice ofLaw, supra
note 8, at 40 n.192 (remarking that the District of Columbia opinion is important
because many national firms maintain offices in Washington, D.C.).
10 Davis, supra note 50, at 5.
"
0 See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagona, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983), overruled
by Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
1" Zagonav. DuBose Enters., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd
sub nom. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983), overruled
by Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
"
2 See Id. at 355.
13 See id.
114 Seeid. Georgia's Business Corporation Code contains tlus provision, but the
state's Professional Corporation Act states that shareholders of professional
corporations are under all obligations and liabilities shareholders m for-profit
corporations orgamzed under the Code. See id. These provisions are currently
codified at sections 14-2-622 and 14-7-3 of the Code of Georgia Annotated. See
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-622, 14-7-3 (Michte 1994).
... See Zagona, 296 S.E.2d at 355.
"
6 See id. at 356.
"7 See FirstBank &Trust Co. v. Zagona, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983), overruled
by Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
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The Georgia Court of Appeals maintained that Stoner was not subject
to vicarious liability because he was not the attorney in the attorney/client
transaction winch created the liability 18 The court relied in part on EC 6-6
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 6-6 states that while
an attorney should not seek to limit his or her individual malpractice
liability to a client, an attorney who is a stockholder in or associated with
a professional legal corporation may limit that liability to the extent
permitted by law 9 The court stated:
[U]nder the Georgia Professional Corporation Act, the personal
responsibility of the attorney to hns client is unchanged. However,
attorney-shareholders ofaprofessional corporation who do notparticipate
in the rendering of the services out of which a claim arises will be free
from personal liability for that claim, should it mature.120
The Georgia Supreme Court, in overruling the court of appeals, stated
that the enactment ofthe professional corporation statute was a "useful and
constitutional act" by the legislature and acknowledged the various
benefits created by such a law "I However, it emphasized that the power
to regulate the legal profession was exclusively within its jurisdiction and
that such a statute "cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so
as to impose a limitation of liability for acts of malpractice or obligations
incurred because of a breach of a duty to a client."'' Indeed, the court
noted that interpretation of the statute was unnecessary, since any attempt
by the legislature to regulate the legal profession presented a separation of
powers problem.' The court noted that EC 6-6 is merely an ethical
consideration, not a rule which "automatically insulates each shareholder
of a professional corporation from liability for the malpractice of the
other."124
Not unlike the early cases which distinguished the legal profession
from other trades or businesses, the Georgia Supreme Court asserted that
"
8 Zagona, 296 S.E.2d at 355.
"
9 See id. at 356 (quoting MODEL CODE OFPROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY EC
6-6).
120Id.
121 First Bank & Trust Co., 302 S.E.2d at 675 (citing benefits such as ease m
acquiring and transferring property and continuity m existence).
122 Id.
'
23 See id.
124Id. at 676.
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the practice of law was not a mere profit-seeking or commercial
undertakng.125 Instead, "a profession is a calling winch demands adherence
to the public interest as the foremost obligation of the practitioner."'26 In
recognition of the usefulness of vicanous liability in ensuring the public
interest in the highest quality legal services, the court stated that the
attorney-client relationship as well as an attorney's relationship to hIs or
her firm was unique and important:
When a client engages the services of a lawyer the client has the right to
expect the fidelity of other members of the firm. It is inappropriate for the
lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek m the shadows and folds of the
corporate veil and thus escape the responsibilities of professionalism.
27
The abrogation of vicarious malpractice liability under the limited
liability business form undermines a client's certainty that an attorney, as
well as hs or her firm, will meet professional obligations. Therefore, the
court held that regardless of the form in which attorneys practice, they
would be held liable for their individual "professional misdeeds" as well
as for those of other firm members."' Underlying tins holding was the
policy against allowing "a corporate veil to hang from the cornices of
professional corporations which engage in the law practice."'2 9
Unfortunately, Georgia's adherence to this policy was short-lived. In
1996, Zagora was overturned by the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling in
Henderson v. HSI Financial Services, Inc.'3 Henderson involved a law
firm organized as a professional corporation which held a contract with
HSI, a financial services corporation, to collect its delinquent hospital
accounts.'' The firm became in arrears in making payments due HSI and
breached a promissory note for that indebtedness. HSI sued the
incorporated firm and its members individually 132
Using Zagona, the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed a grant of
summary judgment to HSI on its clain against the individual attorneys in
the firm for joint and several liability 1 The Georgia Supreme Court
" See id. at 675.
126 Id.
127 Id.
12S See id. at 676.
129 Id.
130 Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
131 See id. at 886.
132 See id.
133 See id.
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reversed, overruling Zagora "to the extent it states that tins court, rather
than the legislative enabling act, determines the ability of lawyers to
insulate themselves from personal liability for the acts of other
shareholders in their professional corporation.1 34 Not only did it opt to
embrace the statutory grant of limited liability for law firms choosing it, the
court also placed a severe limit on its own power to regulate the legal
profession. 135
While acknowledging the court's power to govern whether a
professional corporation could be used by a law firm, the Henderson court
stated that the consequences of such a status, once approved, were within
the legislature's jurisdiction. 136 Zagona did not deny law firns the ability
to organize themselves as professional corporations, but held that firms
could not avail themselves of the limited liability status usually
accompanying such abusmess form. 13 Henderson heldthat attorneys could
continue to use this form as well as enjoy the "same rights and
responsibilities as shareholders in other professional corporations.' 38
In considering the ethical ramifications of its decision, the Georgia
Supreme Court relied on the ABA's approval in Formal Opinion 303 ofthe
practice of law under limited malpractice liability to clients, provided that
an attorney performing the services giving rise to a malpractice claim
remainedpersonally liable.! Thus, the court reasoned, "permitting lawyers
to practice in a corporate entity is consistent with the legal profession's
ethical standards.' 4 °
Prior to the overruling of Zagona, several other state courts favorably
cited the case in preserving vicarious liability within the legal profession.
For example, m Beane v. Paulsen,141 a California appellate court noted that
for the malpractice of one member oftheir professionally incorporated law
firm, two other members had 'omt and several liability to the former client
of their corporation as guarantors of [the firm's] financial responsibility for
malpractice."'" In State ex rel. Wise, Childs & Rice Co., L.P.A. v.
13 Id.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See First Bank & Trust Co. v Zagona, 302 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ga. 1983),
overruled by Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
131 Henderson, 471 S.E.2d at 886.
3 See id. at 887; see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
140 Henderson, 471 S.E.2d at 887
141 Beane v. Paulsen, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Ct. App. 1993).
142Id. at 490.
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Basinger,143 an Ohio appellate court considered the vicarious liability of
attorneys practicing as a legal professional corporation.'" Although the
court stated that a legal professional association was proper under Ono
law, attorneys were bound by a "duty upon a member of a legal
professional association to guarantee the financial responsibility of the
association for its breach of any duty"' 14 Although a "lack of
professionalism" was not at issue in the case, the court cited liberally from
Zagorna "for the express purpose of indicating the continuing personal
responsibility of attorneys who are members of legal professional
associations."'14 Thus far, the overruling of Zagona has not led either the
California or Ohio courts to adopt opposite approaches.
An example of an early and clear condemnation of the use of
professional corporations to limit attorneys' vicarious liability appears in
In re Bar Ass'n ofHawaii.47 As in Kentucky, the issue came before the
Hawaii Supreme Court through a bar association petition. That petition
sought approval of the incorporation of attorneys under Hawaii's
Professional Corporation Law, which provided limited vicarious liability
to shareholders.'48 Although approving of the bar association's desire to
qualify for the federal tax advantages provided for such entities, the court
refused to approve the portion of the proposed rule allowing attorneys to
enjoy limited liability The court cited EC 6-6 of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility as disallowing limited liability within the
attorney-client relationship. 49 If permitted, such a limitation "would not
provide adequate protection to a client's claims against a law
corporation."'50
IV EVALUATION OF KENTUCKY'S REFUSAL TO
PERMIT LAW FIRMS TO ADOPT A LIMITED LIABILITY STATUS
For several reasons, the Kentucky Supreme Court's refusal to grant
approval for law firms to incorporate as LLCs and LLPs was a well-
14 State ex rel. Wise, Childs & Rice Co., L.P.A. v. Basinger, 561 N.E.2d 559
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
144 See id. at 561.
145 Id.
14 Id. at 562.
147 In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1973).
141 See id. at 1268. Hawaii's Professional Corporation Law was repealed in
1987 The Professional Corporation Act is now codified at section 415A of the
Hawaii Revised Statutes. See HAW. REV STAT. ANN. § 415A (Michle 1993).
149 See In re Bar Ass'n ofHaw., 516 P.2d at 1268.
150 Id.
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reasoned and sound result. First, the court's ruling was consistent with the
Kentucky Bar Association's ("KBA") earlier disposition toward attorneys'
responsibilities to their clients. Although written m response to the issue of
attorneys using a firm name msmuating a partnership when not actually
practicing as one, a KBA opinion stated that "there can not be such a thing
as a 'limited partnership' as far as responsibilities and liabilities are
concerned."'' This is because "the public is inclined to believe that the
entire mental and legal resources of the firm are available, if need be."'52
The public has a right to know that an attorney will provide competent
representation guaranteed by the entire firm in which that attorney
practices. Vicarious liability is an important tool in providing this
assurance. First, vicarious liability serves a preventive purpose as a
powerful incentive for attorneys within a firm to encourage and insist that
their colleagues adhere to professional guidelines.113 Second, it provides a
remedial device. Should a client's malpractice claim be found valid, the
client has every reason to expect that his or her full judgment will be paid,
regardless of the insolvency of the attorney who actually committed the
malpractice or of the extent of corporate assets held by the firm.'5
More importantly, regardless of the merit of vicarious liability within
the legal profession, the limitation of this liability is m discord with the
ethical guidelines adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court.'5 5 The
language of Rule 1.8(h) ofthe Model Rules implicitly forbids the limitation
of an attorney's individual or vicarious liability to a client for
malpractice. 156 The Rule does not state that an attorney is precluded from
prospectively limiting only his or her "individual liability" It does not
apply only to the lawyer's liability to his or her personal client, but to "a
client for malpractice."' 57 Certainly, Rule 1.8(h) allows such a prospective
limitation if the client is independently represented in making the
agreement, 15 but this requirement will not be met by the mere addition of
the words "Limited Liability Corporation" to a firm's letterhead or even a
notice of the limited liability status in a retainer agreement. The limited
liability status should not be used to indirectly perform an act the Kentucky
Supreme Court has disallowed attorneys to directly accomplish.
1 Ethics Opinion No. 62, KY. B. 1., Jan. 1974, at 24,24.
152 Id.
153 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
"s' See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
116 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1998).
157 Id.
158 See id.
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Until adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court, the ABA's pro-
nouncements on the issue are not controlling.1 59 To whatever extent they
are considered, the ABA Opinions are far less persuasive than the ethical
opinions promulgated by the KBA, which can take m-depth account of the
needs and expectations of Kentucky attorneys. The power to regulate the
legal profession in Kentucky has long been held by the Kentucky Supreme
Court."6 Blind adherence to the ABA's pronouncements is inconsistent
with this grant of regulatory power to a state judicial entity
There are alternatives to Kentucky's current refusal to permit the
practice of law in limited liability form. Several procedures may lessen, but
not eliminate, ethical concerns. First, if limited liability became available
to law firms, notice procedures would be not only appropriate but
necessary 16 Model Rule 1.4(b) requires attorneys to "explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation."162 It is uncertain what sort of
explanation would be required to allow a client to make a well-informed
choice about the implications of retaining a limited liability firm. 163
Additionally, Model Rule 7.1 forbids a lawyer from making "a false or
misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services,"'lM
and Model Rule 7.5 extends this prohibition to firm names and
letterheads. 161 Several states have held that the designation of "limited
liability partnership" or "limited liability company" will meet the notice
requirement, but others xequire "express and specific notice to every
client."" However, a notation of a firm's corporate status on its stationery
does not meet the Model Rule 1.8(h) requirement that a client be
independently represented before agreeing to an attorney's prospective
limitation of liability 167
Another attempt to resolve the limitation of liability problem under
professional ethics is to require law firms choosing this status to carry
See supra note 46 and accompanying text
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
161 See Davis, supra note 50, at 6.
162 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1998).
11 See Davis, supra note 50, at 6 ("[It may turn out that unless the limitation
is expressly set out, explained, and consented to in each and every engagement
letter, limited liability status may simply not work.").
'64 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1998).
65 See id. Rule 7.5(a).
' Davis, supra note 50, at 6. Some cases state that express waivers must be
executed by clients before attorneys may enforce the liability limitations. See id.
'
6 7 See id.
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insurance m order to satisfy clients' malpractice claims. Thus "solution" has
been utilized m several states, including Rhode Island.'68 Some statutes
make this heightened insurance protection a requirement to obtain a
complete limitation of vicarious liability, while others require insurance
only to cover the firm's general obligations, but not its liability for
professional misconduct. 169 However, required insurance may not serve
anyone's interests in the long run. As more firms organize themselves
under limited liability statutes, insurance companies will become more
concerned about the risk of insuring the firms."' Law firms mayultimately
outsmart themselves should insurance companies find they must provide
protection against more expensive liability than they anticipated: "In turn,
this is likely to make insurers much more interested in firms' financial
status. Some firms may regard that intrusiveness as an acceptable
hidden cost of limited liability, but all shouldbe aware of this as apotential
issue."'
171
Another unsatisfactory result of the imposition of required insurance
for limited liability firms is a potential heightened cost of msurance.'72
Assuming a great number of Kentucky law firms would opt for this status
and assuming insurance companies would raise their premiums for
coverage of limited liability firms, the average cost of legal representation
may rise. Finally, it should be noted that it may be possible for law firms
to practice as an LLC or LLP if they desire to do so because of advantages
unrelated to limited liability In at least one state, law firms have been
authorized to incorporate themselves in ways to accomplish these goals,
provided they do not avail themselves of limited liability ,73
V CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Supreme Court's resolution of the limited liability
problem was an appropriate response to important ethical issues. Vicarious
.
6 See In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (R.I. 1970) ("Because
of the requirement of mandatory liability insurance, the clients served by the
corporation and the members of the public who otherwise deal with the corporation
will not suffer by reason of such limited liability.").69 See Keatinge & Coleman, Practice ofLaw, supra note 8, at 26.
170 See Davis, supra note 50, at 7
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liability plays an invaluable and long-standing role in the state's legal
profession, and its limitation would jeopardize the public's interest in
ensuring that its attorneys remain fully accountable, responsible, and loyal
to their clients. Despite an attempt by other states to sidestep the conflict,
Model Rule 1.8(h) makes clear that attorneys may not seek to limit their
malpractice liability before beginning representation unless the client's
consent is given while represented by independent counsel. The Rule
reflects the importance of preserving attorneys' accountability for their
professional misconduct. Although several states have attempted to lessen
the negative impact of the limited liability status by requiring notice and
insurance, these methods do little to protect the letter and spirit of Model
Rule 1.8(h).

